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ABSTRACT  
 
DISCOURSE, MEANING-MAKING, AND EMOTION: THE PRESSURE TO HAVE A 
“FEMINIST ABORTION EXPERIENCE” 
 
MAY 2019 
 
DEREK P. SIEGEL, B.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY  
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
 
Directed by: Professor Amy Schalet  
 
During interviews with self-identified feminists (n=27), respondents express discomfort 
when their abortion experiences fail to match perceived expectations from the pro-choice 
movement. They describe a “feminist abortion experience” as eliciting a sense of relief, 
empowerment, and detachment. An “anti-feminist abortion,” on the other hand, involves 
sadness, ambivalence, and a high attachment to the pregnancy. Respondents not only 
self-police this boundary but also perform emotion work to change an undesirable 
emotional state. First, I ask how pro-choice norms and constructed and perpetuated? I 
find that people learn what is expected of them from the contents of pro-choice discourse 
and learn about undesirable emotions from their absence in pro-choice discourse. Second, 
I ask how feminists manage discrepancies between these perceived expectations (how 
they believe they “should” feel) and their actual experiences. In particular, what 
motivates them to change their feeling states in the event of such a discrepancy? 
Extending Arlie Hochschild’s feeling rules framework (1979), I argue that because of 
respondents’ personal and collective identities as feminists, they feel obligated to other 
people in the movement to have the “right kind of abortion.” Whereas the feeling rules 
framework suggests that people perform emotion work to achieve an ideal feeling state, I 
argue that they also work to avoid stigmatized emotions. Lastly, I hypothesize that 
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personal and collective identities might also explain emotion work in other social 
movement contexts. When a movement politicizes and promotes certain emotions, 
members will feel obligated to match these norms. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 Due to the polarizing nature of abortion in the United States, pregnant people1 
face heightened scrutiny before, during, and after their abortions. Even their most 
personal experiences have become a site of political contestation; for example, pro-life 
activists argue that abortion elicits regret, and thus it is unsafe and should be banned 
(Siegel 2008; Kelly 2014), whereas pro-choice activists argue that most people feel 
relieved after their abortions (Ludlow 2008; Weitz, Moore, Gordon, and Adler 2008). I 
am interested in how pregnant people navigate these powerful emotional expectations. 
Specifically, I show how group context shapes abortion experience and how ideological 
norms can produce more stress around an often, already fraught situation. Because of my 
focus on feminist-identified people, I also examine how membership in a social 
movement mediates the way somebody processes and evaluates their emotions.  
 I did not set out to study feminist-identified individuals or the practice of emotion 
management, but in my first wave of interviews (n=20), I was struck by respondents’ 
perception that certain abortion-related emotions (such as relief, empowerment, and 
detachment from the pregnancy) are normal and more desirable than others. At that point, 
two questions drove me back into the field to collect more interviews (n=7). First, I 
wanted to learn about how these norms are constructed and perpetuated. In other words, 
how do feminists come to experience them as real? Second, how do feminists manage 
discrepancies between these perceived expectations and their own abortion experiences?  
                                                 
1 Given the fact that not all people who get abortions are women (including transgender men and 
gender non-conforming individuals), I use the term “pregnant people” over “pregnant women” or 
“women,” when discussing this general population (Midwives Alliance of North America). My 
sample contains three genderqueer participants, who do not identify as men or women.  
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 My respondents report that pro-choice discourse normalizes various emotions, but 
they also discuss how the absence of other emotions—such as sadness or ambivalence—
from pro-choice discourse can stigmatize these aspects of their experience. Not only are 
feminists aware of the “right” and “wrong” way to have an abortion, but they also put a 
lot of work into negotiating this perceived boundary. I wanted to understand why the 
failure to conform to perceived expectations would motivate someone to minimize or 
alter their “negative feelings.” I found that my respondents self-police their emotions for 
several reasons. On one hand, they wanted to avoid being labeled a “bad feminist.”  On 
the other hand, due to the precarious state of abortion access in the U.S., they feared that 
their negative emotions would be used to restrict abortion access for other people. 
 To understand how feminists manage these perceived abortion-related 
expectations, I extend Arlie Hochschild’s feeling rules framework (1979) in two different 
ways. Whereas the feeling rules framework argues that people compare themselves 
against a desirable norm, I use the concept of stigma to show how respondents also 
compare themselves against undesirable categories they wish to avoid, developing a 
framework that I call “emotional hierarchies.” I use the concepts of personal and 
collective identity to explain what motivates feminists to self-police their emotional state. 
Whereas Hochschild attributes emotion work to a sense of obligation in private 
relationships (what we “owe’ our loved ones) or on the labor market (what we “owe” our 
customers), I argue that respondents are motivated both by the desire to manage their 
feminist identities as well as a sense of collective obligation to the pro-choice movement.  
 Because emotional hierarchies exist in other political contexts, my findings are 
not limited to this case. Social movement identification and participation might predict, 
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for example, how people articulate their memory of childhood sexual assault (Whittier 
2001) or how they navigate public mourning during the AIDS crisis (Gould 2008). When 
movements politicize personal experience, people who already feel indebted to their 
communities regulate their behavior in the interest of the group. Over the years, social 
movement scholars have demonstrated the role of perceived obligation in rallying 
individuals to join a cause (Polletta & Jasper 2001). I argue that the experience of 
collective identification—and its perceived obligations—also impacts people’s social and 
emotional lives outside the movement context. It is important that we not underestimate 
group-level membership as a determinant of even people’s most personal experiences.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Abortion, Emotion, and Pro-Choice Discourse  
 While abortion discourses vary across time and are contested even within social 
movements, in the United States today two dominant perspectives prevail. Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002) find that pro-choice discourses overwhelmingly 
describe abortion as a gender-based right (24%) or as a private matter between someone 
and their doctor (51%), whereas pro-life discourses frame abortion as murder (48%)2.  
In order to combat anti-abortion stigma, feminists attempt to “normalize” abortion 
through practices like the 1 in 3 Campaign, a storytelling project based on the statistic 
that one in three cisgender women get an abortion in their lifetime (Jones & Kavanaugh 
2014). Through their constant repetition, these discourses produce a “powerful set of 
expectations that burden [pregnant people’s] feelings leading up to and after their 
abortions,” (Millar 2017). 
 Neither pro-choice nor pro-life discourse, however, fully capture the complexity 
of most people’s actual abortion experiences (Keys 2010; Kimport 2012; Millar 2017). 
On one hand, pro-choice activists suggest that upon completing their abortion, most 
people feel relieved and empowered, with little or no attachment to the pregnancy 
(Ludlow 2008; Weitz, Moore, Gordon & Adler 2008). Pro-life activists, on the other 
hand, argue that people always feel attached to their pregnancies, and thus experience 
                                                 
2 These numbers are based on a review of over 18,000 passages from the New York Times and 
Los Angeles Times. 
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degrees of guilt and regret after their abortion (Siegel 2008; Kelly 2014)3. Less formal 
abortion talk can also reinforce which emotions are considered “normal” or “desirable.” 
For example, Mallary Allen (2014) observes how users on pro-choice message boards 
consistently invoke themes such as certainty and empowerment. Since these message 
boards are public, Allen argues that users strategically position themselves within certain 
“sympathetic” formula stories. But if pro-choice discourse teaches feminists what they 
should feel, how do they learn what emotions to avoid? And what occurs when 
someone’s experience deviates from these emotional norms?  
 Scholars who study the relationship between discourse and abortion experiences 
draw heavily on the sociology of emotion, particularly Arlie Hochschild’s feeling rules 
framework (1979). Feeling rules dictate the proper emotion for a given situation, 
including the extent, direction, and duration of this response. “[They] are the side of 
ideology that deal with emotions,” Hochschild (1979) explains, so “when an individual 
changes an ideological stance, [they] drop old rules and assume new ones.” People 
measure their experiences against a perceived norm, becoming aware of any “discrepancy 
between what one does feel and what one wants to feel,” (Hochschild 1979). When 
facing an emotional mismatch, they will then perform emotion work or emotion 
management (both terms refer to the same process) in order to resolve this tension. In the 
context of abortion, feeling rules “do not automatically produce the desired emotion 
state,” but rather pregnant people engage in different forms of emotion work to “achieve 
a feeling state that is [most] consistent with their ideology,” (Keys 2010).  
                                                 
3 Drawing on various psychological literatures, Kimport (2012) argues that regret is not an 
emotion but a cognitive evaluation. Therefore, it is not a “feeling rule” per say but a prescribed 
way to think about and reflect on your own experience.  
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 In her research, Hochschild examines how and why the failure to meet a feeling 
rule motivates someone to engage in emotion work. In other words, what makes someone 
so discontent with a mismatch between ideology and experience that it drives them to 
change their emotional state? Hochschild argues that emotion work involves social 
exchange. In private relationships one feels they “owe” their loved ones an emotional 
debt and on the labor market, in order to keep their jobs, service workers feel they have 
an obligation to please their customers (1983). For example, flight attendants are 
expected to “disguise fatigue and irritation” by forcing a smile or communicating a “more 
appropriate” emotion. 
 Yet why would my respondents perform emotion work in a situation where 
neither their relationships nor their employment status are threatened? While Jennifer 
Keys (2010) provides a thorough review of how individuals manage the gap between 
abortion ideology and experience4, abortion scholars do not address why pregnant people 
might feel compelled to resolve this tension in the first place. Hochschild’s feeling rules 
framework is definitely one piece of the puzzle, but in order to fully understand what 
motivates respondents’ emotion work, we must incorporate other theoretical approaches. 
 
Stigma and Hierarchies of Experience  
  Because “normal” and “abnormal” are co-constructed categories, the very 
presence of an emotional norm suggests an undesirable or stigmatized counterpart. 
According to Goffman (1963), stigma occurs when someone has or is perceived to have 
                                                 
4 Some strategies include suppressing inconsistent emotions, avoiding situational triggers, rituals 
and substance use, as well as reinterpreting one’s experience through a different lens. 
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an attribute that deviates from a social norm. Stigma involves a drop in social status or 
prestige, which can result in negative social, psychological, and even financial outcomes.  
Sexuality scholars, however, argue that deviant behaviors do not necessarily stigmatize 
social actors, and that stigma and labeling are two distinct processes.  For example, 
although homosexuality itself carried stigma in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the law 
and religion treated it as a behavior rather than an identity. One could repent the sin or 
accept a punishment without carrying the stigma as an individual (Plummer 1981).  
 When we normalize some behavior and stigmatize others, we end up constructing 
and reinforcing hierarchies of experience. In Gayle Rubin’s analysis of sex hierarchies 
(1994), she observes an unequal distribution of value among behaviors. According to 
Rubin, certain sex acts—such as coupled, vanilla, and/or monogamous sex—belong to a 
“charmed circle” because they are seen as normal and natural, whereas pathologized acts 
such as group, kinky, and/or casual sex occupy the “outer limits” of the model. People 
perceive a boundary between “good and bad sex,” and if broken, fear this will produce 
“sexual chaos,” which explains why social actors invest so deeply in this boundary.  
 Borrowing the concept of sex hierarchies, I argue that pro-choice feminists 
construct a similar hierarchy of abortion experiences when they normalize the expression 
of certain emotions and stigmatize others. Stigma, in fact, is key in understanding both 
how the pro-choice movement produces emotional norms and how individuals negotiate 
these expectations. Just as individuals compare themselves against pro-choice feeling 
rules, they also assess their own and other people’s experiences vis a vis perceived 
emotional hierarchies. According to Hanschmidt et al. (2016), abortion stigma contains 
three sub-categories: perceived (“awareness of the devaluing attitudes of others,”), 
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internalized (“when a [person] incorporates devaluing social norms into [their] self-
image,”), and enacted (“actual experiences of discrimination,”). This paper involves 
primarily the first two sub-categories, and also departs from most literature on abortion 
stigma, which tends to conflate abortion-related stigma and anti-abortion sentiments 
(Kumar et al. 2009). As Keys (2010) asserts, people tend to internalize messages that 
align with their ideological worldview, so to understand how feminists navigate 
emotional expectations around abortion, we must also consider their political identities.  
 
Navigating Collective & Personal Identities in Social Movements  
 In the social movements literature, collective identity refers to the “shared sense 
of one-ness or we-ness….real or imagined…among those who comprise [a] collectivity,” 
(Snow 2001). For some authors, Polletta & Jasper (2001) argue, collective identity “is 
shorthand for the affective connections one has to members of a group that oblige one to 
protest with or on behalf of them.” Common characteristics of collective identity include 
shared definitions, boundaries between in-group and out-group, group consciousness, and 
negotiation among members (Melucci 1995; Taylor & Whittier 1992). Personal 
identities—or the meanings someone attributes to themselves—differ from collective 
identities but may also overlap in meaningful ways (Snow 2001; Polletta & Jasper 2001). 
Among my respondents, “feminist” constitutes both a personal and collective identity.  
 In recent years, social movement scholars who had previously explained political 
participation in terms of self-interest or class-consciousness (Fireman & Gamson 1979; 
Hunt & Benford 2004) have turned to collective identity because it “better captures the 
pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize,” (Polletta & Jasper 
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2001). Some scholars believe that collective identity does not function well at the 
movement level due to vast internal variation (Saunders 2008). Others argue that because 
meanings “are constantly changing rather than static,” that collective identities can exist 
even in heterogeneous feminist movements (Whittier 1995; Rupp & Taylor 1999). In 
fact, Whittier (2001) argues that individuals “make sense of and reconstruct emotions 
collectively through movement practices.” Given that individuals possess multiple 
personal and collective identities, Snow and McAdam (2000) signal the potential for 
conflict or incongruence. When identities converge, “an extant collectivity provides a 
venue for an individual to act in accordance with his or her personal identity…[but] in the 
absence of correspondence between personal and collective identities, some variety of 
identity work is necessary in order to facilitate their alignment.”  
 In this paper I explore the overlap between emotion work and identity work when 
pregnant people’s abortion experiences differ from pro-choice feeling rules. I also argue 
that the sense of mutual obligation associated with collective identity shapes the way that 
people negotiate their abortion-related emotions. Although individuals claim a multitude 
of identities, political membership is particularly salient in determining which movement 
discourses someone consumes and internalizes. These movement discourses, and the way 
that individuals reproduce this discourse, set the parameters for what responsibilities 
group membership entails. I believe this study will address a crucial gap in the social 
movements literature, because while some scholars study the production and 
management of feeling rules, we know little about how someone’s attachment to a 
movement mediates the process of emotion management.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 Entering the field, I wanted to learn more about how people make meaning out of 
their abortion experiences. This question emerged from my background as an abortion 
counselor, offering emotional support and helping low-income callers acquire funding to 
terminate their pregnancies5. Noticing that people’s abortion experiences were almost 
always more nuanced than either pro-choice or pro-life discourses suggest, I decided to 
interview pregnant people about their recent abortions. In the course of this initial 
research, I re-framed my research to focus on respondents’ perceived expectations from 
the pro-choice movement about what an abortion should feel like. I wanted to know how 
these particular expectations are constructed and maintained, and how respondents 
manage discrepancies between these expectations and their own experiences. More 
specifically, some respondents expressed profound discomfort if they deviated from these 
perceived norms, and I wanted to understand this reaction. With a new focus, in the 
second round of interviews, I decided to speak with more people who were both involved 
in the pro-choice movement and have had recent abortions. Below I detail the specifics of 
the iterative process of question formation, data collection, and question reformulation.  
 I conducted the first round of interviews from August 2017 – January 2018 
(n=20), restricting eligibility to individuals over the age of 18 whose abortions occurred 
within the past five years. I was interested in the range and complexity of people’s 
abortion experiences, particularly in how they make meaning out of the process. The bulk 
of each interview revolved around a reflection exercise where I asked respondents to 
                                                 
5 Due to the 1977 Hyde Amendment, no federal funds in the United States can go towards 
abortion, meaning that Medicaid does not cover abortion in 34 states. The average first-trimester 
abortion costs $470 (Jones and Koostra 2011). 
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describe what they were thinking, how they were feeling physically, and how they felt 
emotionally before, during, and after their most recent abortions. Each intensive, semi-
structured interview lasted between 50-120 minutes. Because people typically share 
abortion stories in small, private settings, I found that the intimate nature of a semi-
structured interview closely mirrors how people typically share their abortion stories6. 
Each respondent consented to our conversation being voice-recorded and upon 
completion received a $20 gift card to a major retailer. They also selected a pseudonym.  
 My recruitment process involved two approaches, both of which allowed potential 
respondents to self-select into the study. First, I contacted around 50 community centers 
and organizations in two Northeastern U.S. cities, both with high availability of clinics 
and relatively low barriers to abortion access per state laws. I requested that these 
organization share my call for participants with their membership and about half of them 
responded to my request; 19 groups agreed to distribute my flyer, mostly student groups 
and feminist organizations. From there, I used a respondent-driven sampling method, 
asking participants to share word of my study and my contact information with their 
networks. Overall, 32 people reached out to inquire about my study, five of whom did not 
meet the eligibility requirements and seven who ultimately did not schedule an interview. 
 Using NVIVO, I coded responses based on how someone “framed” their abortion 
experience: as a routine medical procedure, an opportunity for growth, an emotional 
burden, and a form of loss. I arrived at these frames inductively, and while there were 
others, none showed up as consistently as these four did. Most people mobilized multiple 
frames, which often co-existed without conflict but sometimes were experienced as 
                                                 
6 Eliasoph and Lichterman make a similar claim in defense of Ann Swidler’s “Talk of Love,” 
explaining the similarities between the interview setting and how people usually discuss matters 
of love and intimacy (2003). 
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contradictory. In particular, I was struck by the degree to which respondents grappled 
with perceived expectations (from the pro-choice movement) about abortion-related 
emotions. Based on this finding, I wondered how these expectations are constructed and 
how feminists react when their experiences fail to match these perceived norms.  
 I decided to go back into the field, conducting more interviews (n=7), specifically 
with pro-choice activists who had recently terminated a pregnancy. In addition to 
questions from the first round, I asked respondents to reflect on feminist messages about 
abortion, which of these messages resonated with their experience, and how these 
messages are communicated. I conducted this second round of interviews in July 2018, 
advertising this time exclusively with pro-choice organizations that shared my call for 
participants on social media. Having introduced the option of a video rather than in-
person interview, participants in this round reside in various parts of the country. Perhaps 
due to existing networks of reproductive justice activists, all out-of-state respondents also 
resided in states with relatively high access to abortion, and I did not notice any 
difference in the quality of these interviews. I concluded this round when I noticed that 
the data had reached saturation.  
Table 1. Demographic Information 
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 Of the 27 people I interviewed, 18 specifically identified as part of the pro-choice 
or reproductive justice movements. Five more self-identified as feminists or discussed 
their intent to become more involved in the movement. The remaining four mobilized 
popular feminist slogans (such as, “my body, my choice”) but did not explicitly self-
identity. My sample includes both cisgender women and genderqueer individuals (who 
use they/them pronouns), most of whom were highly educated and from a middle-class 
household across a range of racial and ethnic backgrounds. With the exception of one 
respondent who terminated at 14 weeks and another at 21 weeks of pregnancy, the rest 
had first trimester abortions (<13 weeks). 14 respondents opted for the in-clinic vacuum 
aspiration abortion, ten had the mifepristone/misoprostol combination at the clinic, 
otherwise known as the “abortion pill,” and three respondents acquired misoprostol 
outside the clinical context, two by preference and one because her country of residence 
(at the time of termination) did not offer legal abortion services. Finally, the 
overwhelming number of atheist or agnostic respondents in my sample likely have 
encountered less pro-life messages in the absence of religious backgrounds.  In other 
words, my findings do not necessarily reflect the general population but rather 
individuals who affiliate with feminist movements and who, more specifically, consume 
pro-choice media and internalize pro-choice messages about abortion.  
 
Positionality  
 I approach this topic with an extensive background in abortion financial and 
counseling hotlines. These last few years, I have spoken with several thousand 
individuals before or after termination from all over the U.S. and Canada. Anticipating 
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concerns about my political motivations and gender presentation7, I chose to disclose on 
my recruitment materials that I work for “local and national abortion rights 
organizations,” to establish a sense of trust and legitimacy. Because I am studying how 
feminist-identified people negotiate pro-choice messages, I am less concerned, in this 
particular study, about whether this choice alienated a more diverse ideological sample.  
 While people always present themselves in consideration of potential reference 
groups, by disclosing my professional background I may have further skewed responses 
toward what someone thought I might want to hear. This disclosure helped establish 
quick rapport with respondents. As I became interested in how feminists hold each other 
accountable for having a certain kind of abortion, I saw how disclosing my professional 
background in some ways mimics this social process. If respondents perceive us as two 
feminists discussing their abortion experience, then this transforms the interview itself 
into a useful source of data that I analyze in greater depth below.   
  
                                                 
7 Because my name and gender expression are typically read as male, at odds with a cultural 
understanding of abortion as a “women’s issue,” I inferred that this would be another point of 
concern. Indeed, each participant asked about my “interest in the subject,” and several explicitly 
cite my gender as the reason for their inquiry  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS  
“I just wanted the abortion story where a woman feels liberated afterwards”: The 
Makings of a Feminist and Anti-feminist Abortion Experience 
 Respondents describe the pro-choice movement itself as an important source of 
education about how they are supposed to feel about their abortion. The messages they 
see and hear in the media reinforce the idea that abortion should elicit particular 
emotions, such as relief or empowerment. “I’ve seen a bunch of Facebook articles or little 
cartoons where a woman gets an abortion and that’s it,” Lucy explains, “there’s little 
emotional nuance.” Andi discusses her experience reading pro-choice message boards 
before her abortion: “For the most part, they were all very positive. People talk about 
how their abortions let them continue with school or their careers.” Like Andi, Rania 
researches abortion online to see what she should expect from her own. “All of the 
websites said you were supposed to feel relief after your abortion,” Rania says, “You 
were supposed to feel relieved that it was over with.”  
This portrayal of abortion and abortion-related emotions creates a standard by 
which interviewees judge their own experience.  Rania says, for instance: “I waited and 
waited to feel that relief but it never came. I mostly felt empty and irritable.”  Lucy also 
expected and aspired to the emotions that she knew she was supposed to feel.  Lucy did 
not initially feel attached to her pregnancy. “This isn’t really a big deal,” she remembers 
thinking, “I don’t feel sad.” Looking back at the experience and recognizing her limited 
support system at the time, Lucy now sees this reaction as somewhat strategic: “I don’t 
think I could process it all at once. I couldn’t deal with what was happening so I cut 
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myself off emotionally. I didn’t want to feel attached.” According to Lucy, her ideal 
abortion experience would not have involved emotional ambiguity or a sense of loss. “I 
just wanted the abortion story where a woman feels liberated afterwards. She just goes 
back to her business career and I wanted it to be that simple.” 
Some interviewees feel affirmed by pro-choice discourse that normalizes the 
abortion process. “I like that there are people writing about the fact that it’s not a hard 
choice for everybody and not everybody feels conflicted about it afterwards,” Julie tells 
me, “I’m glad that people are [admitting that] sometimes [the decision is] really clear.” 
Sam feels similarly. “Looking back, and it’s been about a year and a half since my 
abortion, it feels like a normal part of my life,” Sam says, “Abortion can seem like this 
big mystery, so I like to make a point that it’s a normal thing that happens to a lot of 
people.” For individuals like Julie and Sam, pro-choice discourses resonate with and 
affirm their own experiences 
For the vast majority of the people I interviewed, however, the normalizing 
discourse of abortion in pro-choice circles can feel constraining. In other words, 
respondents feel that they are not supposed to have strong, negative, or complicated 
emotions. “You’re not allowed to grieve. You’re not allowed to feel complicated about 
having an abortion,” Nicole says, summarizing feminist messages about abortion that 
they have heard. “And it’s not necessarily [communicated through] what’s being said, but 
it’s in what’s not being said.” As a reproductive justice and indigenous rights activist, 
Nicole remarks: “I’ve never seen people being given the space and compassion to just sit 
with the complicated feelings they may have around abortion.” They continue: “We talk 
 17 
 
about mental health and anxiety and depression in social justice circles, but it doesn’t feel 
acceptable to talk about these things in relation to abortion.”   
Maria illustrates the disconnect between movement discourse and the narrow set 
of emotions it legitimates, on the one hand, and lived experience on the other.  After her 
second abortion she felt angry with her partner over his absence and that he did not 
understand the extent of her grief and other emotions, “he was like this external living, 
walking connection to that pregnancy, to that energy, or whatever.” Around this time, the 
Shout Your Abortion twitter campaign began, which aimed to challenge abortion stigma 
in the wake of a congressional push to defund Planned Parenthood. “I was super excited 
[about the campaign],” Maria says, “But at the end of the day it wasn’t the full picture for 
me, and I was suppressing the more emotional connection. I felt mad love for my 
pregnancies and a lot of reproductive justice spaces don’t make room for that part of my 
experience.” Her impulse to suppress these other emotions, unrepresented in the Shout 
Your Abortion campaign, suggests their perceived lack of value.  
 The content (and absence) of pro-choice discourse do not merely appear to 
endorse the expression of certain emotions and stigmatize others. They create, I argue, a 
hierarchy of abortion experiences that differentiates between “feminist” and “anti-
feminist” emotions: relief and empowerment are perceived as normal or “feminist” 
responses to abortion, whereas, emotions like ambiguity and grief occupy an unnatural or 
“anti-feminist” category. This hierarchy impacts how pregnant people interpret and 
manage their own emotions. Valerie, for instance, invokes the normativity and 
desirability of certain abortion experiences over others. “I felt sad,” she says, “and I know 
it’s crazy. I don’t even want to say it [out loud], but I felt like I was losing my baby. I’m 
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sure it was a fetus at that point, but I started reading, being very cliché – I don’t want to 
be cliché – I read that at this week the baby develops fingernails and eyes.” One 
interpretation is that Valerie uses words like “crazy” and “cliché” to describe her 
attachment to the pregnancy because such attachments do not exist within the rubric of 
pro-choice discourse. Perhaps Valerie dismisses her sadness when she has no viable 
models with which she can reconcile these feelings with other feminist experiences.  
 Dylan also perceives there to be stigma attached to certain abortion-related 
emotions. They seem uncomfortable with how they feel four years after their abortion: “I 
still feel a bit of shame, which I hate to admit. But I do…I’m embarrassed by the fact that 
I [feel ashamed].” They describe the ambivalence they feel when seeing pro-life 
billboards driving down the highway. One read, “Aren’t you glad that your mom chose 
life?” Dylan scoffs, “It makes me feel like I chose death when I should be feeling that I 
chose not to bring someone into this world in the shitty condition that it’s in.” From one 
perspective, it appears that Dylan grapples with both pro-choice and pro-life messages 
about abortion—neither adequately affirms their experience. But it is also worth noting 
that Dylan would have preferred to feel relief after their abortion, indeed believes they 
“should have” felt relief. Dylan feels ashamed for overstepping the perceived boundary 
of what feminists deem desirable or normal reactions to abortion.  
 Interpersonal exchanges reinforce the categories of feminist and anti-feminist 
abortion experiences. Through such interactions, people normalize certain abortion 
stories and appear to stigmatize others. For example, while working at a women’s center 
on her college campus, Valerie received multiple messages about the “right way” to 
terminate. On one hand, her boss and coworkers understood abortion as an empowering 
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experience and expected Valerie to feel the same way. When Valerie, a Black woman, 
disclosed her abortion to her white coworkers, they “acted very excited, like it was a 
badge of feminism.” Her coworkers also implied that abortion was an easy decision or a 
routine practice: “It was very like, “so you’re getting an abortion.” Like that’s the logical 
next step and getting an abortion is easy and unchallenging because I’m a feminist.” 
Valerie reflects further on this expectation of emotional detachment, “[they see abortion] 
as something passive. Like if you’re pregnant then it is just a box you check off.”  
  I am not suggesting that feminists maliciously thrust their worldview onto others. 
Rather, in the process of comforting a friend, someone may reinforce expectations, 
particularly when they lack personal experience of abortion. After all, in their ubiquity, 
pro-choice platitudes may be the most available tool at their disposal. For Andi, while 
comfortable now, at the time of her abortion she regretted not knowing more about her 
pregnancy options. Her feminist friends from the college activist circuit, however, were 
not equipped to affirm her emotional ambivalence. “Because usually feminists only talk 
about positive stories, I don’t think my friends were expecting there to be negative 
feelings associated with [my abortion],” Andi explains. They attempt to normalize the 
experience for her: “they kept saying things like “I’m not judging you” or “it’s your body, 
your choice.” I know it’s my choice, but that doesn’t mean I don’t feel like shit about it 
right now.” Aside from failing to address Andi’s specific emotional needs, 
“normalization” suggests an emotional ideal, sending the message that low attachment to 
the pregnancy is both normal and desirable.  
 Inadvertently, respondents may also contribute to the narrow discourse of 
acceptable emotions in pro-choice circles by selectively sharing certain details of their 
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experience but not others. Some variation, of course, is expected; activist Renee Bracey 
Sherman (2016) reflects that someone’s story can change every time they share it because 
of shifting circumstances. Nevertheless, several respondents describe how normative 
expectations shape the story-telling process. Jenny, for example, did not disclose her 
“negative feelings” during an abortion speak out because “it didn’t feel like it would have 
been productive for the space … it wouldn’t have matched what we were all talking 
about.” In other words, she believes that a “normal” abortion exists, and further assumes 
that her feelings of guilt and attachment to the pregnancy make her experience an outlier.  
 Gina, a long time activist in the women’s movement, also perceives her abortion 
as atypical. She felt hesitant to participate in the interview because she thought the 
sadness and regret she experienced “might throw off [my] work.” At one point, Chelsea 
even asks, “Are you getting a lot of people like me [in your sample]? In reality, the 
majority of the feminist-identified people I interviewed did express some emotion that 
deviated from these perceived feminist norms. Take RJ, for example. At one point, she 
recalls thinking during her medication abortion, “when will this parasite be gone?” First 
discovering her pregnancy, however, she felt a lot of anxiety and dread. “I tried to force it 
out [by drinking] alcohol,” RJ tells me. “I remember sobbing in my room, holding my 
stomach and saying I’m sorry. I think I was apologizing to myself, I was apologize to the 
kid that could’ve been.” Lucy, at various points, describes her pregnancy as a “clump of 
cells,” “a possible energy,” and “like a real human child to [her].” Despite this 
multiplicity of experiences, however, my respondents have internalized a distinction 
between normal and abnormal feelings, a distinction that enables a tiered value system 
(desirable/undesirable; feminist/anti-feminist) to emerge.   
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Self-Policing the Boundary Between a “Feminist” and “Anti-feminist” Abortion  
My respondents work hard—often unconsciously—to create the emotions they 
regard as feminist and to avoid the emotions they regard as anti-feminist. RJ, who works 
with several pro-choice groups in her area, uses humor to cultivate a detached emotional 
state more aligned with the belief that abortion is just another medical procedure. 
Although she feels very angry before her abortion, RJ minimizes her anger when talking 
to her sister by making a joke: “well if statistically one in three women get abortions, 
then you [and our other sister] don’t need to worry about it.” Others work to replace so-
called undesirable emotions. For Jenny, the fear of embodying an anti-feminist abortion 
was palpable. After her abortion she felt conflicted, “thinking about the spirit of [her] 
potential child and how [she] may have wronged it” by terminating the pregnancy. These 
feelings, however, did not match her desired state of mind. “I wanted so badly to just be 
happy and feel liberated,” Jenny says, “I had this guilt as a feminist for not having the 
traditional story where I felt empowered. I felt guilty about being guilty!” Over the years, 
Jenny has reconciled these anxieties through her activism, but at one point recalls, 
“feel[ing] like I’d abandoned all my values and principles because of how I felt.”  
 Jenny experiences two layers of guilt. The first involves her attachment to the 
pregnancy and a sense of possible loss, which she understands as an “untraditional 
feminist story,” or what I call “an anti-feminist abortion.” It deviates from the norm, or 
how many respondents believe they are supposed to feel. Jenny also feels what she later 
calls “bad feminist guilt” because she has overstepped the boundary of appropriate 
behavior: “to be totally frank, I was scared of judgment or rejection from the feminist 
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movement.” She also expresses concern that having negative feelings meant that she was 
letting down previous generations of feminist activists. Notice how Jenny believes that 
her abortion experience has the potential to either confirm or deny her value as a feminist. 
Whether or not other feminists would alienate her is a separate question. Rather, we can 
say that Jenny has internalized the perceived stigma associated with negative feelings, 
and fears that this stigma would also threaten her feminist identity.  
 Nicole also speaks to the ways in which abortion-related emotions have become a 
litmus test of feminist identity. “We’re made to feel like bad feminists for having 
complicated feelings after an abortion or during a pregnancy,” Nicole explains, “we’re 
told that we should feel empowered by our decision and that when it doesn’t happen that 
way, that there’s something wrong with us.” Again, not only are certain emotions 
stigmatized but also the people who experience them. Nicole continues, recalling hushed 
conversations with patients that she had as a clinic worker. “Someone might say, “Am I a 
bad person if I feel sad about this?” or “I hope you don’t think I’m a bad person because 
I feel complicated about this.” According to Nicole’s interpretation, patients do not feel 
like bad people because they have sinned or murdered their babies, as pro-life ideology 
might argue. Rather, they are self-conscious about feeling sad or complex about their 
abortions, for having violated the perceived norms of pro-choice ideology.  
 Gina, too, sees her feminist identity at stake in the pressure to have the “right” 
kind of abortion, without emotional baggage or attachment to the pregnancy. Of her 
second abortion, which took place shortly after the birth of her third child, Gina says, “I 
was completely crushed. I felt like I abandoned one of my children.” Her friends, 
however, interpreted the abortion quite differently from Gina and were not validating her 
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experience. “It’s just an abortion,” someone told her, “it’s a collection of cells.” Gina felt 
dismissed: “they weren’t hearing that [the abortion] wasn’t the right thing for me.” Her 
feminist friends and colleagues could not understand the depth of her sadness, so instead 
pathologize Gina. “From their perspective,” Gina explains, “something must have been 
wrong with me because it can’t be about the baby.” It feels like a rebuke of her feminism. 
“They didn’t come out and say, this is un-feminist, but that’s what it felt like…and I get 
it. I’m a feminist, and I would’ve been annoyed by me before this whole thing.” 
Respondents fear that undesirable emotions undermine one’s ability to claim a feminist 
identity and will diminish their credibility in the pro-choice movement.   
 
Emotion Management in a Precarious Political Context 
 The broader political context also provokes emotional self-regulation. More 
specifically, respondents fear that having an anti-feminist abortion experience may 
threaten the precarious state of abortion rights in the U.S. Maria, for example, worries 
about how “anti-abortion activists use [a person’s connection to the pregnancy] to argue 
that abortion is wrong. It’s like that kids story, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie. If you give 
[pro-lifers] an inch, they’ll turn it into a whole thing. Like the anti-abortion side might 
use my emotional connection [to the pregnancy] to argue that abortion is wrong. They 
call it Post-Abortion Syndrome or whatever.” Jenny adds: 
 “I feel like the feminist movement doesn’t always allow for much nuance because 
 the other side will have a gotcha moment. They’ll be like, “see? You regretted it, 
 so maybe we shouldn’t have legal abortion at all.” Even on the comments section 
 of an online forum, folks who are anti-choice latch on so hard to anyone who has 
 anything other than a positive experience as a justification for why abortion 
 shouldn’t be legal or should only be legal up to a certain point.”  
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Embedded in the reproductive justice movement, respondents can imagine very real 
consequences for overstepping the boundaries of a feminist abortion experience.  
 Respondents also demonstrate profound awareness of this bifurcated meaning 
system when it comes to their own stories. They know that other people will interpret 
their complicated abortion experiences through the more narrow categories of good/bad, 
feminist/anti-feminist. Comparing her first and second abortions, for example, Frances 
explains how she felt sad and overwhelmed by her first one, especially because she was 
in a committed relationship at the time and also keeping the abortion secret from her 
family. “It didn’t feel like Ra, Ra, Ra, my body, my choice,” Frances says, “I guess I 
identified with the other guys, the first time around, the bad guys.” Frances says this with 
a smile and we both laugh at the absurdity of these categories. Frances works with a 
doula collective and is about as far from an anti-abortion activist as I could imagine. Yet 
Frances understood the polarized categories of feminist and anti-feminist to place her 
behavior under such intense scrutiny that even a bout of shame or sadness could threaten 
her position as a feminist subject and turn her into “one of the bad guys.” 
 Concern that pro-life activists will take their experiences out of context shapes the 
way that people share their abortion stories. In what would become a recurring pattern 
during my interviews, someone discloses an abortion-related emotion that violates pro-
choice expectations and then immediately qualifies this emotion. “I started feeling 
complicated about my abortion,” Maria says, “but I never regretted it, never for a 
millisecond, either of my abortions.” I never asked Maria or any of my participants if 
they regret their abortions, but she felt the urge to clarify and “correct” a possible 
misconception that sadness or ambivalence were her primary emotional reactions.  
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 This rhetorical formula, disclosure followed by immediate qualification, occurs 
again and again. Hermione, for example, describes her abortion as “emotionally all over 
the place,” warning her husband that he would need to support her, even if she spent the 
48 hours of her mifepristone/misoprostol regiment in tears. She proceeds to minimize 
these emotions: “I think that has to do with the hormones.” Susan says, “I’d say that I felt 
kind of depressed for a couple days and latent sadness for a few weeks after that, it was a 
somber thing.” Then she quickly adds, “But I’m really OK. I didn’t have any regrets 
about it, and I knew that it was the right thing to do.” Valerie discloses that she felt a 
sense of anguish upon leaving the clinic, and then clarifies this statement. “Even in that 
pain I never regretted [the abortion]. I was just sad this was happening to me.”  
 In the context of our interview, I am yet another reference group and possible 
source of accountability. Having established myself as a feminist during the recruitment 
process, I imagine that participants presumed that I share the dominant perspectives of 
the pro-choice movement. Therefore, such “corrections” could have been meant to signal 
to me, as the researcher, that they are not overstepping the boundary of a feminist 
abortion experience. On the other hand, given respondents’ high levels of education, I 
imagine they are familiar with the research process and the power I wield as a researcher 
to present their stories to audiences both within and outside feminist circles. For this 
reason, the self-policing of undesirable emotions may involve anxieties both around 
feminist identity management and minimizing potential political backlash.  
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
 Throughout our interviews, respondents continually differentiate between 
desirable or “feminist” emotions (relief, empowerment, and detachment) and undesirable 
or “anti-feminist” ones (sadness and ambiguity). The pro-choice movement does not 
outwardly endorse this binary, so in this section I elaborate on how these norms are 
perpetuated and ultimately experienced as real. I also examine how feminist-identified 
people negotiate gaps between perceived expectations and their own experiences. What 
motivates someone in this situation to change their emotional state? To answer these 
questions, I engage with the following concepts: feeling rules, stigma, and personal and 
collective identity. Extending Hochschild’s feeling rules framework, I find that 
respondents self-regulate their emotions for several reasons, in pursuit of desirable 
outcomes and to avoid undesirable ones. Finally, I discuss how the perceived obligations 
associated with social movement participation can impact someone’s day-to-day life.   
 The feeling rules framework represents one piece of this analytic puzzle. As 
Hochschild suggests, my respondents observe discrepancies between their experiences 
and perceived pro-choice expectations. Dylan, for instance, expresses embarrassment at 
feeling ashamed when they “ought” to be feeling relieved after their abortion. Moreover, 
in the case of a mismatch between feeling rules and experience, respondents engage in 
emotion work to resolve this tension. For example, after disclosing sadness or another 
negative emotion, they might clarify their lack of regret, contorting their emotions toward 
something they perceive as more desirable. 
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 I propose emotional hierarchies as a complement to the feeling rules framework—
a tool, collectively, for understanding how people negotiate ideological expectations. 
Respondents do not only differentiate between clusters of abortion-related emotions, but 
also assign them hierarchical values, which is to say that some emotions are seen as 
desirable and others carry stigma. Pro-choice abortion talk serves an instructive function, 
teaching pregnant people what to expect from their own experiences and reinforcing 
particular norms. While scholars have pointed out the discursive construction of a “good 
abortion,” (Allen 2014; Settles & Fugerson 2015) and its impact on pregnant people’s 
experiences (Keys 2010; Millar 2017), I argue that pro-choice discourse also constructs a 
negative or stigmatized category, which I call an “anti-feminist abortion.” When certain 
stories or emotions are absent from pro-choice discourses, my respondents believe this 
sends the message that no one should feel that way, particularly feminists.  
Norms “become real” through their repeated presence or absence in pro-choice 
discourse. They also “become real” as respondents reproduce the hierarchy between 
feminist and anti-feminist abortions, through public speech acts, private reflections, and 
their own self-regulatory behavior. We cannot ignore the fact that pro-life discourses 
exist and likely make intelligible respondents’ feelings of sadness or ambiguity. Chelsea, 
for example, discusses both pro-life and pro-choice feeling rules. “I don’t necessarily 
think of [the pregnancy] as a child,” she says, “It’s funny, I go back and forth because 
there’s the Catholic guilt in me that really hates the feminist part of me.” I single out pro-
choice discourse, however, because people in my sample self-identify as feminists and 
participate in pro-choice communities. As Keys (2010) reminds us, folks usually 
internalize those messages most consistent with their ideological background. 
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 Moving on, in the feeling rules framework, Hochschild (1979) highlights an 
important interpretive act that precedes emotion work. She argues that when someone 
senses a gap between their ideal and actual emotion state, that this observation provokes 
them to alter their emotions. According to this perspective, respondents pursue the 
perceived norm or feeling rule, motivated by the desire to have a feminist abortion 
experience. An emotional hierarchies perspective, on the other hand, sees the stigmatized 
category as an equally powerful drive in this process. Respondents do not only compare 
themselves against the desirable category but also against the undesirable category in 
order to avoid stigma. What I call an “anti-feminist abortion,” Martin et al. (2017) refer to 
as “dangertalk.” Abortion providers “perceive that the pro-choice movement requires 
them to remain silent about the ethical and emotional complexities of their work.” Like 
my respondents, they experience “the expectation (and burden) of self-censorship.”  
 But even if someone notices a mismatch between their experience and the desired 
(or undesirable) feeling state, this does not guarantee emotion work. People deviate from 
all kinds of social norms, so what makes feeling rules so powerful? Hochschild offers one 
explanation, arguing that people manage their emotions when they feel they “owe” an 
emotional debt in either a private relationship or on the labor market. I argue that 
respondents’ personal and collective identities, as feminists, are key in how they 
negotiate their abortion-related emotions. In particular, the theory of collective identity 
helps explain why feminists feel obligated to adhere to pro-choice feeling rules, even 
when neither their private relationships nor their employment status are at stake.  
 On one hand, feminism involves a respondent’s personal identity or sense of 
self—for example, I ask Jenny, “what is a feminist?”, to which she replies, “Me. I’m a 
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feminist.” When respondents perceive a hierarchical distinction between a feminist and 
anti-feminist abortion, their self-regulatory behavior constitutes both “emotion work” and 
“identity work,”. Take the aforementioned pattern, where feminists disclose a negative 
emotion and then immediately assert a lack of regret or that they are “really OK.” As a 
form of emotion work, someone changes an emotion that is inconsistent with perceived 
pro-choice feeling rules. As a form of identity work, someone negotiates how others 
perceive them as a feminist and how they appraise their own identity. When they qualify 
their negative emotions, this could be an appeal to say that just because they exhibit the 
traits of an anti-feminist abortion, that does not make them a “bad feminist.”  
 Over the past century, feminists have diverged on a number of issues, including 
porn and sex work (Rubin 1984), constructing a dichotomy between “good” and “bad 
feminists” and a perceived mandate to police one another’s feminist identity (Gay 2014).  
Due to the intensity and ubiquity of pro-choice messages about what an abortion should 
feel like, abortion has become another site in which feminists have been called upon to 
prove their authenticity. And whether or not feminists do experience social consequences 
for having the wrong kind of abortion, many believe they will. The problem of identity 
performance, however, does not belong exclusively to feminism. Societies contain a 
multitude of “accountability structures” (West & Zimmerman 1987) that essentialize 
difference and call upon individuals to conform to ideological norms. I argue that social 
movements function as quasi-accountability structures that have the capacity to police 
members through perceived (and sometimes actual) criteria.  
 In addition to personal identities, respondents also collectively identify as 
feminists. When asked about the pro-choice movement, respondents often speak in the 
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collective voice. For example, RJ explains, “I didn’t realize how little we talk about the 
abortion itself.” In this situation, “we” refers to the social movement organizations to 
which she belongs. At the end of our interview, Holly argues that “we’re making progress 
toward more nuanced abortion stories,” “we” being the movement itself8. Social 
movement scholars argue that through the process of collective identity actors develop a 
sense of mutual obligation toward one another (Polletta & Jasper 2001). This sense of 
obligation associated with feminist collective identity—and respondents’ personal 
identities as feminists—both incite respondents to monitor and manage their emotions.   
 I have argued that respondents imagine a boundary between feminist and anti-
feminist abortion experiences, and they fear that crossing this boundary will pose a threat 
to abortion access. Although respondents have already had their abortions, they feel they 
owe other people the same opportunities they have had. This commitment drives 
respondents to self-police their feelings, which have come to represent far more than their 
own personal experience in the court of public opinion. It also explains why some 
respondents care so much that their experiences deviate from pro-choice feeling rules. 
Teske (1997) and Lichterman (1996) argue that that social obligation and self-interest are 
not mutually exclusive motivations to political participation. Similarly, I find that both 
self-interest—in preserving one’s standing as a feminist—and social obligation—toward 
collective goals and other group members—can provoke someone to change their 
emotional state when it deviates from the desired norm.  
                                                 
8 It would be misleading to suggest that my respondents perceive or support a universal feminist 
movement; after all, they offer fierce critiques of mainstream feminism’s exclusion of  
marginalized voices. Even so, respondents still believe in a collective feminist project to advance 
the rights and dignity of all people. 
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 In some ways, abortion presents a unique case of emotion management, both in 
the sheer amount of abortion talk in the United States and in the degree of scrutiny 
abortion encounters in other fields (such as law, medicine, religion, etc.) So how might 
these findings apply to other social movement contexts? Some authors have already 
discussed how different movements use feeling rules to encourage members to self-police 
their emotions. Gould (2008), for example, studies the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power 
(ACT UP) and their mobilization strategies, finding that activists were often encouraged 
to suppress public grief and channel it into anger. Whittier (2001) discusses how the 
feminist anti-rape movement expects assault survivors to express a mixture of trauma and 
resistance to “legitimize women’s claims against male violence.”  
 In these cases, and other cases where someone’s emotions have been politicized, I 
argue that personal and collective identities are key to understanding how feeling rules 
come to matter, and why someone would feel obligated to change their emotional state. 
In terms of personal identity, someone might feel, for example, that their status as a 
“good feminist” or “radical queer activist” would be threatened if they deviate from these 
internalized feeling rules. And in terms of collective identity, we know that ACT UP is a 
solidarity-based organization (Gould 2008). I imagine that members might have felt that 
if they were not angry enough, then other queer people would continue to die from AIDS 
and government inattention. Based on my findings on how feminists negotiate their 
abortion-related emotions, I call for future research on how collective identity produces a 
sense of obligation to a social movement and its members, and how this obligation 
provokes emotion work at the individual and collective level.     
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 Whereas we typically think of emotions as a private experience, abortion-related 
emotions are often the object of public scrutiny. For example, pro-choice activists argue 
that most people feel relieved after an abortion. Speaking with feminist-identified people 
about their recent abortions, I noticed how uncomfortable some respondents are when 
their experiences deviate from what they believe they “ought” to be feeling. I wanted to 
know how these expectations are constructed and experienced as real, and how feminists 
manage gaps between these perceived expectations and their own experiences. During 
my interviews, I found that some respondents try to minimize or alter their “negative 
emotions.” I am interested in what motivates them to do so, as well as what this case can 
tell us about how social movement identification shapes emotion management.  
 The feeling rules framework partially explains this puzzle. Respondents, for 
example, perform emotion work to make themselves feel more relieved or empowered, as 
they believe the pro-choice movement demands of them. But they are also motivated by 
the desire to avoid stigmatized emotions, such as sadness or attachment to the pregnancy. 
In this paper, I develop an emotional hierarchies framework to account for how 
respondents compare themselves against both desirable and undesirable categories. 
Focusing only on people’s pursuit of an ideal emotional state, or what I call a “feminist 
abortion experience,” we miss out on other aspects of emotion management, including 
respondents’ avoidance of what I call an “anti-feminist abortion experience.”  
 I also argue that both personal and collective identities motivate someone to 
change their emotional state. Feminists self-police their emotions out of self-preservation 
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and collective responsibility, not necessarily out of “obligation” to loved ones or 
customers, as Hochshild (1979) suggests. On one hand, knowing that their emotions will 
likely be interpreted through the narrow, binary categories of good/bad, feminist/anti-
feminist, they regulate their emotions as a form of identity presentation—not wanting to 
be labeled a “bad feminist.” On the other hand, many respondents also feel a collective 
obligation to uphold abortion access for all people, and fear that pro-life activists might 
misappropriate their negative emotions in order to claim that abortion is harmful.  
 Furthermore, I hypothesize that personal and collective identities provoke 
emotion work in other social movement contexts. Because collective identity involves a 
sense of mutual obligation, it produces the conditions under which someone is likely to 
care whether or not their experiences match the perceived norm. This research prompts a 
re-consideration of the “everyday experience,” of belonging to a social movement. For 
instance, what are other ways in which the perceived obligations associated with personal 
and collective identification affect members’ lives? How does social movement 
participation blur the oft-contested lines between personal and private spheres?  
 Lastly, while I understand how the pro-choice movement can use normalizing 
discourses to combat anti-abortion stigma, this can also compel feminists to feel they 
need to have the “right kind of abortion.” In order to combat the pressure to have a 
feminist abortion experience, my respondents offer several suggestions that might break 
this hierarchy. Gina, for example, argues that a politics of non-shaming might better fit 
abortion advocacy than a paradigm of normalizing vs. judgment. Whereas a normalizing 
vs. judgment paradigm focuses on how someone experiences their abortion, a politics of 
non-shaming redirects attention toward the behavior of other people and the forms of 
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support they do or do not offer. I agree with my respondents’ critique of “normalization.” 
If movement actors wish to better accommodate pregnant people’s realities, it is not 
enough to expand what counts as “normal” (ie. “it’s normal for some people to feel sad or 
conflicted”). This would merely shift the boundary between a feminist and anti-feminist 
abortion, still assigning someone moral and political value based on their experience.  
 Andi argues that the pro-choice movement simply needs to expand the types of 
stories they profile online and in their advocacy efforts. While it is not necessarily the 
responsibility of the pro-choice movement to resolve individual feminists’ anxieties 
around abortion, I do want to highlight the role of pro-choice discourse in reproducing 
the emotional hierarchies that organize the way people negotiate abortion-related 
feelings. Because pregnant people internalize those messages most aligned with their 
political ideology, I think the pro-choice movement could be quite effective in mitigating 
the perceived tension between feminists’ expectations and experiences of abortion. It is 
not that abortion cannot be relieving or empowering, but for many individuals it involves 
greater complexity, and as Nigerian author Chimamanda Adichie reminds us, the danger 
of a single story is not that it is wrong, bur rather that it is incomplete (2006).  
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